What explains the apparent contradiction between Denmark's reputation as a liberal, tolerant society, and the recent rise in wide-spread xenophobia there? The root causes of the present wave of xenophobia are fundamentally similar to the rest of Europe: they grow primarily out of the tensions inherent in the transition from an industrial to postindustrial society. However, its unusual virulence across an apparently inclusive mainstream political spectrum, and departure from the established norms in the country, is an outgrowth of the present challenge to the egalitarian, anti-modern ethos that has steered Denmark toward its present state. Modern Danish nationalism, heavily influenced by the ideas of N.F.S. Grundtvig, has emphasized anti-elitism, decentralization, and egalitarianism. However, for the first time since at least the 1920s these political cornerstones are being seriously challenged and re-examined. Immigration has become one of the symbols of, and primary battlefield in, the challenge to the social consensus that has existed throughout most of the 20th century.
ethnic street violence is not uncommon; nationalist and almost racist rhetoric appears on a frequent basis in the press, and even the left wing of the political spectrum does not always forcefully counter racist discourses as it has in many other countries. 1 The result is a situation of distrust and low-level conflict between many recent immigrants and much of the established population.
What are we to make of the contradiction between the imagery of Danish society as almost uniquely pacific, civil, tolerant, and inclusive, with the remarkable recent success of xenophobic discourses and parties in Denmark? The positive imagery and reputation are not undeserved. Denmark has been an extraordinarily peaceful and successful society by any number of measurements for most of the past century. Its peacefulness has been particularly notable during a violent century in Europe. Liberal democracy and the rule of law have had a particularly strong hold -almost no fascist groups developed even at the height of the phenomenon in Europe, and the country has been free of fundamentally divisive political conflicts since the 1940s.
In other countries with more overtly nationalistic, heterogeneous, or insular histories, a xenophobic reaction to foreigners might be more expected, and perhaps easily acknowledged by their populations. However, in Denmark, ethnic homogeneity and the re-emergence of an age-old societal split, which has lain dormant for much of this century, makes the accommodation of new societal groups unusually difficult. Although
Denmark has a reputation as a bastion of equality and civilization, foreign observers would do well to remember the historical roots of this phenomenon. The new less tolerant picture of Denmark is a logical by-product of the same forces that created egalitarian Denmark.
Of course, xenophobia is a general phenomenon in Europe today, and has arisen along similar lines in many countries across the continent. Racist discourse is common across the continent, and anti-immigrant parties have had considerable success in the last twenty years, notably in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands. 2 A consensus seems to have emerged that the rise of xenophobia, and certainly its most overt political expression in the so-called "Radical Right Wing Populist
Parties" (RRP) is a result, fundamentally, of the transition from an industrial economy to a post-industrial one. This process has had at least two pivotal effects, as Jens Rydgren explains:
First, traditional working class milieus have been decomposed, as a result of both the shrinking size of the industrial sector and the increased diversification of the working class, being the result of specialisation and a growing demand of technical skills. As a sign of this development we see declining levels of class voting, especially among young workers. Second, the postindustrialisation process has created new 'loser groups' -not coping with the increased demands of education, internationalisation and flexibility -which are prone to support political programmes promising a return to the stable values and virtues of 'the status quo ante '. 3 This is a phenomenon broadly observable across the continent, and goes some of the way to explaining the xenophobia seen today. Those are all important issues to be examined when studying the institutionalization of xenophobia through political parties. The growth of xenophobia and the success of those discourses in Denmark share many of these same immediate causes as in the rest of the continent. However, this paper will turn to the history and particularities of Danish nationalism, the same forces that resulted in the country's characteristic egalitarianism and social-inclusiveness, as an explanation for the dramatic and successful growth of xenophobia there.
Traditional Danish Nationalism
The most important single factor in the apparent discrepancy between typical Danish openness and attitudes toward immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, lies 3 Jens Rydgren, "Explaining the Emergence of Radical-Right Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark," West European Politics (Spring 2004) 27:3, 478. (474-502) . 4 See, Kitschelt & McGann (1995) , McAdam (1996) , Kriesi et al (1995) , and Rydgren (2003) He argued that to be a good Christian a person had to be profoundly self-aware; in order to be properly self-aware the believer had to be in touch with his or her cultural and historical background. He believed that every people had a unique "folk spirit", through which its members could find their true nature. This background, or "folk spirit" was expressed most clearly in traditions such as song, dance, language, literature and so on.
He, and his growing number of followers, valued the eccentricities of local customs, legends (such as Norse mythology), dialects, self-sufficiency, tight communities, and distrusted "foreign" influences such as were often found in Copenhagen, for example at the university.
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This mode of thinking became very important in the formation of Danish national consciousness -in the formation of the imagined community of Denmark. 14 It grew initially out of the countryside, propagated by a class of wealthy land-holding peasants through a concrete political programme. Although Grundtvig believed in an "organic" Buckser, 17. 14 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991) .
form of nationalism, he, and his followers, set up institutions that were important in building a sense of "Danishness" across the country. First were "folk high schools" which emphasized the importance of the folk spirit, the Danish language, egalitarianism.
The schools' purpose was quite explicitly to help "awaken the inner spirit" of the Danish peasants; to help them realise their full potential, and to compete with the educated class in Copenhagen. 15 This class came to play a very important role in the ensuing political struggles and societal transformations. Because of late 18 th century property reforms which had allowed for the creation of a relatively large property owning class of peasants, the economic success of cooperatives, and the cultural and educational success of folk high schools, a class of wealthy peasants came to dominate the small and largely agricultural country. The "urban" elite of the suddenly smaller and democratising unitary nation state, was not able to resist the political power of the reorganised peasant classes. Unlike in many other countries, the urban working class, such as it was, allied with the peasants and participated in their political and cultural discourses, mostly because of its relatively small size.
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Grundtvigianism had permeated Danish society to such an extent by 1913 that the Social Democrats explicitly adopted it as their ideology too. 22 Although the original Grundtvigians, and many in the cooperative movement, did not consider urban labourers to be part of the "real" Danish people, their ideas had sufficiently influenced Danish industrial society, which also relied primarily on small-scale production, that they were essentially co-opted. The Social Democrats, the party of the urban labourer, accepted the power of the prosperous peasants, again reflecting their dominance, but extended their ideology to the whole country, incorporating the urban working class as the "backbone" of the Danish people. Their ideological revision was compatible with Grundtvigianism, and borrowed most of its themes, but was not identical. It stressed the land and the people, but put renewed emphasis on the ability of the people to "build" their own society in their own land.
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Working together, the Liberals (Venstre), and the Social Democrats revised the constitution in 1915 marking a victory against the older, patriotic, elitist school of thought, born out of the composite state. The revision marked a return to the spirit of the 1848 constitution after the reactionary amendments of 1866. 24 The 1915 constitution marked a transition to a more inclusive form of democracy and the beginnings of the ideological hegemony of the "folkist/Grundtvigian" school. The compromises made by 21 Østergård, 37. Grundtvigian thought was strongly contested in the late 19 th century and into the 20 th . The Lutheran culture of Denmark, which had existed in a similar form from the time of the reformation until Grundtvig's time, emphasized conformity and social cohesion to a large degree. The reformation had been unusually state driven in Scandinavia, and the "top-down" nature of the project had prevented the social fracturing that had occurred in Germany and the Netherlands. As a result, state and church were unusually united, helping to develop a strong national consensus with regards to morality, law, and institutions. The resulting mentality in much of the population emphasized solidarity, but also conformity. 27 This aspect of the existing culture adapted itself relatively easily to Grundtvigianism, although tension existed between its conformity and respect for institutions, and the populism and individualism of the newer ideology.
However, elite, conservative groups, such as civil servants, the urban bourgeouisie, the monarchy, and the remnants of the aristocracy clung to an older patriotic nationalism based on the idea of Denmark as a top-down composite state. Until the 1920s at least, the "Right" party (Højre), and its successor the Conservative People's Party, representing mainly the landed nobility and other conservative elements, advocated a less "people/folk" oriented vision of Denmark. 
Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Politics of Xenophobia
Some writers believe that Grundtvigian nationalism was vital in shaping the Danish response to Nazi persecution of Jews in Denmark during the Second World War.
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Andrew Buckser explains:
the Jews had long maintained their own culture, their own language, and their own religious beliefs despite political disenfranchisement and geographic dispersion. They had done so in ways which Grundtvig would have found very appealing. They had cultivated an ancient ancestral language; they had maintained their rituals and celebrations; they had held close to the religious beliefs of their ancestors… and the predicament of the Jews during the war mirrored that which the Grundtvigians imagined for the Danes.
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The Danish population's reaction to the situation of the Jews is often considered to be unique amongst the peoples of Europe. Academics have had some trouble explaining the spontaneity and solidarity of the rescue despite the fact that anti-semitism had been widespread in the country before the war. The key to the rescue, along with geographic and political realities such as the proximity of neutral Sweden, or the unusually lenient attitude of German authorities, lies in the empathy felt by many Danes for another small ethnic group struggling for self-preservation during the war.
How then can we explain the current reactions to refugees and other immigrants?
A population heavily influenced by Grundtvigian respect for tradition, moved to protect a persecuted minority might be expected to be charitable toward Bosnian or Somali It was a bit strange and there were hardly any foreign workers and dark-haired people and such like, so they thought we looked very nice and we got sweets and we got money and we got bikes and we got clothes and everyone clapped their hands because we looked so nice. It was a lovely time the first two years.
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This passage reflects some of the paternalism of the time, but also the openness and good relations between the groups. Public opinion, as reflected in the media, was mixed on the idea of mass-immigration, but not overtly hostile to foreigners. Employers, and even some unions accepted the idea of importing foreign workers in aid of the labour shortage. 39 However, within a few years hostility increased and the government restricted immigration procedures, partially in response to social pressure. In 1973 it froze all nonrefugee immigration, largely due to the economic problems brought on by the oil crisis.
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The early acceptance of immigrants might be explained by the good economic times, or the Danish economy's need for workers. Pedersen, 151. Danes thought that the "foreigners" would go home when their jobs finished, as many
had not yet brought their families with them to settle.
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This initial reaction to immigrants can also be explained by a Grundtvigian interpretation of Danish nationalism. At this time immigrants were still so few in number and so remote from most Danes' daily experiences that they could still belong to a category of foreign people, whose customs and lives had little impact on Danish society.
They were no threat to the "spirit" of the Danish people; immigrants did not interrupt the homogenous traditions of an essential Denmark. The dominant concerns were economic, as reflected by the Danish press and government. 43 As can be seen in the remarks of the Turkish woman, Danes were impressed and amused by the peculiarities of the foreigners, treating them like curious children, with no overt racism.
As the 1970s and especially the 1980s wore on, the tone of relations became increasingly negative. Media and press reports reported more and more on the problems of immigration to the point that this discourse came to be a dominant theme in People's Party, probably because of its lack of appeal in the working class due to its opposition to the welfare state, and because of its explicit appeals to biological racism. Muslim country under the new law. Many picked up on the theme that Denmark was being swamped by its own generosity, and that it was taking in far more refugees than were its "fair share" to the detriment of its own population at a time of economic stagnation. However, it was also a time when the numbers of people applying for refugee status in Europe had also increased significantly due to political instability and population growth in source countries. own institutions, rather than the earlier conflict around relations with Germany, German minorities, and the legitimate source of domestic power.
Conclusion
While distrust of newcomers, especially those with alien cultures, is widespread in the world, and by no means a unique phenomenon in Denmark, some particular Although Denmark has a reputation as a bastion of equality and civilization, foreign observers would do well to remember the historical roots of this phenomenon.
The new less tolerant picture of Denmark emerging, most dramatically from the cartoon controversy, is a logical by-product of the same forces that created egalitarian Denmark.
The over-riding national discourse has not changed suddenly; social conditions in the country have changed and for the first time the rigidity of Danish cultural conditioning is readily apparent.
